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and entry restrictions in the industry. As expected, deregulation facilitated the entry and expansion of nonunion trucking operations and produced high rates of business failure among trucking companies, particularly highcost union operations. Whereas traffic had shifted to the unregulated private carrier sector (i.e., firms transporting their own cargo) during the regulatory period, deregulation generated a shift of traffic back to the now deregulated for-hire sector.
The effects of deregulation on union density and union wage premiums were predictable. No longer able to maintain costly union operations in the face of lower-cost nonunion operations, union density and unionnonunion wage differentials decreased following deregulation. Rose and Hirsch find that union density in the previously regulated for-hire sector fell from about 60% during the 1970s and early 1980s to about 30% by 1984-85, while the union-nonunion wage differential fell from about 50% during to an average 30% during 1979-85. Although, for any given labor market environment, sustainable union premiums and union density are inversely related (Lazear 1983 ), deregulation represented a dramatic change in the environment, leading to both lower coverage and wage premiums. Stated alternatively, the Teamsters would have had to have agreed to far more substantial decreases in union wages and benefits if they were to preserve union coverage among drivers at regulatory period levels. The effects of deregulation on the wages and employment of nonunion drivers in the previously regulated sector, and both union and nonunion drivers in the unregulated private carrier sector, depend on labor demand and supply elasticities, threat effects, and rent sharing. These issues are examined in some depth by both Rose (1987) and Hirsch (1988) . They conclude that there was little evidence of nonunion rent sharing during the regulatory period and that changes in nonunion driver wages following deregulation largely mirrored wage movements elsewhere in the economy (implying a highly elastic labor supply curve).
A primary limitation of the Rose and Hirsch studies was the small size of the truck driver samples in the previously regulated for-hire sector after 1980 (about 100 drivers per year, most of whom are nonunion). Associated with their small samples was large variability in estimates of union wage effects. 
III. Data and Evidence
The data base for this study comprises 96 monthly CPS surveys conducted between January 1983 and December 1990.3 Use of the 1983-90 CPS surveys, besides increasing annual sample sizes approximately twelvefold, provides more recent evidence on wage determination in the trucking industry. Evidence on union density and union wage premiums thus allows us to reexamine the conclusions reached by Rose (1987) and Hirsch (1988) . In addition, design of the CPS allows construction of adjacent-year panels in which data on a portion of drivers are observed for 1983-84 through 1989-90 (see the Data Appendix). Based on longitudinal evidence, changes in wages associated with individual-specific changes in union status are examined. Such evidence allows us to address the question of what portion of the sizable union-nonunion wage differential is in fact a rent and what portion results from unobserved quality differences between union and nonunion drivers.
In order to compare results to those for May 1973-85, selection of the sample and modeling follow that presented in Hirsch (1988) . The 1983-90 CPS sample includes all male truck drivers in the labor force, ages 16-64, who have data provided on usual weekly earnings, usual hours worked per week, and union status and whose hours worked are at least 30 hours. I distinguish between truck drivers in the for-hire or common carrier sector of the industry (this includes both general commodity and contract carriers), defined as drivers who designate their industry of employment as the trucking service industry, and drivers in the private carrier sector, defined as drivers who designate their industry of employment as something other than the trucking service industry. Owner operators are not included in the sample since self-employed workers are not asked the CPS earnings supplement questions. Drivers employed in the for-hire sector sample generally were covered by ICC regulation and thus affected directly by de3Beginning in January 1983, union status questions were asked of the outgoing rotation groups (ORG) in each monthly survey rather than only in the May public use surveys. The ORG "earnings microdata files" are made available by the Data Services Group at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. regulation, whereas drivers in the largely unregulated private carrier sector were affected only indirectly by deregulation. Finally, table 1 allows a comparison of the union coefficient 0, measuring union-nonunion wage differentials conditional on characteristics included in vector X, with the mean union-nonunion log wage differential unadjusted for characteristics. Accounting for differences in worker characteristics explains little of the observed union premium, as seen by the fact that the conditional differentials are only moderately lower than the unadjusted differentials. In part this reflects relatively small differences between union and nonunion drivers in schooling and other characteristics and in part the relatively low returns on some of these characteristics. For example, the within-occupation (trucking) rate of return to schooling averages .018 across years in the for-hire sector. While differences in schooling between union and nonunion drivers are small, unionized drivers tend to be older (by about 6 years) and somewhat more likely to be married and white than do nonunion drivers.
Previous analysis by Hirsch (1988) for the 1973-85 period indicated that real wage movements among nonunion truck drivers in the for-hire sector, and among both union and nonunion drivers in the private carrier sector, largely mirrored wage movements among a control group of nontruck operatives, selected to approximate long-run reservation wage and employment opportunities. Rose (1987) utilizes broader control groups and reaches a similar conclusion. Table 2 provides information for 1983-90 for two samples of male workers-a group of nontruck operatives with occupations equivalent to those chosen by Hirsch (1988) and a sample of all blue-collar workers in manufacturing. Other selection criteria are identical to those used to select the truck driver samples. Information presented for the two control groups parallels that found in table 1.
The descriptive data provided in table 2 provides measures of economywide wage movements and union-nonunion differentials during the 1983-90 period. The pattern previously found for truck drivers in both the forhire and private carrier sectors corresponds reasonably closely to economywide patterns among the control groups. There is relatively little change in union premiums and average real wage rates during the 1980s, although the control groups do display some deterioration in real wages during the late 1980s (fringe benefits, of course, are not included in this measure of hourly earnings). The similarities in tables 1 and 2 help reinforce the previous conclusion that, apart from the wages of unionized drivers in the for-hire sector during and immediately after deregulation, the wage move- ments of both union and nonunion drivers have largely mirrored economywide wage movements. The similarity in wages between truck drivers and other occupations, even in the face of a restructuring of the trucking industry and substantial shifts in traffic associated with deregulation, strongly suggests a highly elastic labor supply curve. Apart from the substantial decrease in wages among union drivers in the for-hire sector following deregulation, real wages of drivers have proven to be relatively invariant with respect to demand and employment shifts.
In order to illustrate more directly the gains associated with larger sample sizes, separate monthly regressions in the for-hire sector are estimated for January 1983-December 1990. Table 3 
IV. Longitudinal Analysis: Is the Union Premium a
Compensating Differential?
A potential problem in previous analyses has been the inability to control for unobservable determinants of truck driver quality. Specifically, employee and employer sorting make it likely that part of the observed unionnonunion wage differential among drivers reflects a compensating quality premium rather than a rent. Quality differences are most likely to arise because employers paying union wages can select higher quality drivers from among drivers in the job queue. Quality differences might also arise owing to lower quit rates or greater occupation-and firm-specific skills among more highly paid drivers. Higher quality drivers also might have where In Wi, represents the log wage of driver i in year y, vector X includes control variables and its coefficient vector 1 (assumed fixed over time), ,ay represents regression constants allowed to vary by year, t represents the logarithmic union-nonunion wage premium assumed fixed over time, Xi is a driver-specific fixed-effect constant over the 2 periods for which each driver is observed, and &,y is a random error term with zero mean and constant variance. If the omitted fixed effect (qhi) capturing unmeasured driver skill differences is correlated with union status, estimation of (2) in levels form will lead to biased estimates of t.
In difference form, letting t equal panel period y minus y -1, equation (2) In difference form, fixed-effect /i falls out, therefore purging correlation between UN and unmeasured driver quality differences. Panel-specific intercepts Aat capture both wage changes among drivers who do not change union status and the effect of 1 additional year of experience (AEXP = 1 for all observations, whereas AEXPSQ varies with the level of EXP). The union wage premium t is now estimated based on wage changes among union status changers, where union joiners have AUN 1, union leavers AUN = -1, and nonunion and union stayers AUN = 0. The control variables in X vary little or remain fixed over the 2 periods. Nonwhite, veteran status, and region (by design of the CPS) remain fixed and fall out, while changes in experience equal one and are reflected in the period intercepts. In addition to the change in union status and period dummies, included explanatory variables are change variables for schooling, experience squared, marital status, and sector (for-hire or private), and dummies for region. Equation (3) restricts estimates of t to be symmetrical such that wage gains for union joiners are equivalent to wage losses for leavers and assumes panel period wage changes are equivalent for nonunion and union stayers. The following less restrictive specification relaxes these assumptions, allowing wage changes to differ between nonunion and union stayers and different estimates of t for union joiners and leavers:
A In Wit = Aat + P3AXLt + toIUNOIit + t1OUNIOit + tIIUN11it + A~it.
(4) UNOI, UNIO, and UNII are dummy variables set equal to one if the driver is a union joiner, leaver, or stayer, respectively. The parameter ao, provides a longitudinal estimate of the union wage premium based on the sample of union joiners, compared to the base group of nonunion stayers; -(TIO -t,) provides an alternative estimate of the union premium based on the sample of union leavers, compared to the group of union stayers. Separate annual estimates of To,, tio, and Til are possible but entail considerable loss in efficiency and a high variability in estimates owing to the small number of union joiners and leavers in each panel. Table 4 In levels analysis not shown, union joiners are found to earn more than nonunion drivers even in the initial year when both are nonunion, and union leavers are found to earn more than nonunion drivers in the second year when both are nonunion. These results, along with the longitudinal estimates presented in table 4, are consistent with the existence of a queue of qualified drivers for union jobs, with those selected being more able than the average nonunion driver.
How much of the union wage advantage represents a rent, and how much is a compensating premium for labor quality? There is no unique decomposition of the union-nonunion wage differential into quality and rent components. But if it is assumed that there is no measurement error and that union status change is exogenous, or, more specifically, that drivers who are union members for either or both of the years have homogeneous labor quality for given measured characteristics (other than union status), such a division can be approximated by comparing the union premiums estimated above for joiners and leavers, to the observed differential in the levels equation.10 Let 0.053 be our best estimate of the longitudinal union premium, based on the average of the estimated wage premium for union joiners and leavers in equation 3. This is only 19% of the observed levels premium (.053/.279 = .190). Thus, the estimates imply that much of the observed union-nonunion wage differential for truck drivers is not a rent but, rather, reflects a compensating premium for driver quality.
As is widely recognized (e.g., Freeman 1984; Griliches and Hausman 1986; Card 1991), measurement error in the union variable can cause substantial downward bias in longitudinal estimates of the union premium; 0 The direction of bias is indeterminate if union status change is endogenous. For example, if union leavers voluntarily leave union for nonunion jobs, there will be a downward bias in the union premium estimate for leavers since unusually high wage opportunities increase the probability of voluntary job change. However, involuntary union job loss is likely among drivers in companies with particularly high wage scales, leading to estimates of bias in the opposite direction since these drivers would experience unusually large wage decreases. the bias will be larger the smaller the number of union changers and the larger the proportion of the sample with incorrectly classified union status. There are two principal sources of measurement error in the union variable-inaccurate answers given by survey respondents or recording errors by the census and incorrect allocations by the census among workers without responses to the union question. The proportion of inaccurate responses or recording errors on the union question is reasonably small (2.5%-3.0%) and has little effect on levels estimates of the union premium (Mellow and Sider 1983; Card 1991 Bound and Krueger [1991] ). Measurement error is increased here by focusing on a single occupation, since occupational mobility is a source for some of the true variation in union status and by using brief 2-period panels, since the noise-to-signal ratio is higher the shorter the time period. In contrast, driving skills are largely occupation rather than firm specific, so drivers can change employers and union status without changing occupation. Unknown is whether truck drivers are more or less likely than are average workers to report incorrectly their union status.
Approximately 2% of workers have their union status allocated by the census through a matching of nonrespondents to responding workers with similar characteristics. Among the sample of union status changers, a higher proportion will have had their union status allocated since an incorrect allocation is likely to produce a measured changer. Unfortunately, the allocation flag indicating whether union status is allocated is not contained on the 1983-88 microdata earnings file tapes provided to the BLS by the census; they are available beginning -90 and 1990-91 panels, produce coefficients on AUN of .122 and .104 , re-Although the seriousness of measurement error in the union change variable cannot be known with certainty, the large difference in estimates between the longitudinal and levels equations (.053 vs. .279) suggests that a substantial portion (half may be a good guesstimate) of the union-nonunion differential for truck drivers is a compensating quality premium. For example, suppose that measurement error is so severe that longitudinal estimates of the quality-adjusted union premium are biased downward to a third of their true value. Even then, over 40% of the estimated crosssection union-nonunion wage differential (already adjusted for measurable wage determinants) can be attributed to unmeasured quality differences (1 -[(3 X .053)/.279] = .430) . The results support the expectation that employers offset some of the union-nonunion wage differential through selective hiring; both driver quality and wages are higher than they would be absent unionization. Although the pure rents accruing to unionized truck drivers cannot be estimated with accuracy, the continuing decline in union density during 1983-90 suggests that these rents remain substantial.
The previous longitudinal analysis examined wage changes among workers who are truck drivers in adjacent years. The data set also allows an examination of wage changes among workers changing occupationsfrom truck driver in year 1 to another occupation or from another occupation in year 1 to driver in year 2. Such a sample is constructed using the same sampling criteria used to construct the previous panel of drivers. Estimates from this sample allow measurement of the gains and losses associated with changes into and out of both truck driving and union membership.
The Alternatively, the loss in human capital resulting from occupational change could be substantial since driving skills are to a considerable degree occupation specific, but this loss may be offset by gains associated with voluntary (i.e., nonrandom) job change. The estimated longitudinal union premium for the trucker-trucker sample of drivers is about 5%, as seen previously in table 4. But for the samples of drivers changing occupation, estimated wage changes associated with the change in union status are 12%-14%. Although higher than the estimate from the TT sample (perhaps due in part to lower measurement error bias among occupation changers), the longitudinal premiums remain far lower than estimates of the differential in levels, which are approximately .30 for all three groups of workers (levels results for the occupational changers are not shown). Although the exact magnitude of the union premium associated with union status change is again in doubt, the large difference in premium estimates between the levels and change equations supports the conclusion that much of the observed union-nonunion wage differential in fact reflects labor quality differences in drivers.
V. Interpretation and Conclusions
Deregulation in the trucking industry provides an unusually rich opportunity to study the creation and dissolution of economic rents associated with entry, price, and operating restrictions. Past studies have provided strong evidence that rents arising from regulation were reflected not only in higher profitability and in the market value of operating rights but also in the form of higher labor costs. Previous analyses, however, were limited by small sample sizes of truck drivers, and the concomitant high variability of estimates, during the postregulation period. This article examines wage determination among truck drivers using the 96 monthly samples from the Current Population Surveys for 1983-90, thus facilitating more current and precise estimation of union density and union-nonunion wage differ-entials during the deregulatory period, as well as longitudinal analysis to examine wage changes for union joiners and leavers.
The evidence is broadly supportive of the conclusions reached previously by Rose (1987) and Hirsch (1988) . In the previously regulated for-hire sector of the trucking industry, union density fell continuously from about 60% during the regulatory period to about 25% by 1990. Union-nonunion wage differentials (in log differences) fell from about 0.40 during 1973-78 to a range of .26-.33 during 1983-90. Union-nonunion wage differentials among drivers in the unregulated private carrier sector were about 0.30 during the earlier period, but they have fallen little during the 1980s and are roughly similar in magnitude to union premiums in the for-hire sector.
Longitudinal analysis is performed on seven panels of truck drivers for whom data are available for 1983-84 through 1989-90. Wage changes among union joiners and leavers allow inferences to be made about unmeasured quality differences between union and nonunion drivers. Union premium estimates based on longitudinal data are considerably lower than are union-nonunion differentials estimated from levels data. Based on results from the panel data, it is concluded that a substantial portion of the unionnonunion wage differential is a compensating premium for unmeasured driver quality, consistent with the hypothesis that union employers select and retain relatively high-quality drivers.
Data from Deregulation in the trucking industry has limited the ability of firms to continue maintenance of costly unionized trucking operations, except where high wages can be offset by productivity advantages or where union operations are partially protected from nonunion competition as is the case in many LTL markets. Evidence from the CPS indicates that the cost pressures brought to bear on union wages have produced a narrowing in what once was a very large union-nonunion wage differential in the forhire sector of the industry. For the Teamsters to have maintained union density at levels obtained during the regulatory period, however, the union would have had to agree to wage and benefit concessions far greater than they did. Evidence clearly indicates that the rank and file were unwilling 13 Union workers generally have lower permanent turnover rates than do nonunion workers. If, on the one hand, this generalization is also correct for truck drivers, the ratio of tenure to years of total driver experience will be higher for union than for nonunion drivers. On the other hand, the business failure of numerous union trucking operations during the 1980s would lead to a bias in the opposite direction.
to support many of the concessions actually recommended by the Teamster leadership, while the even greater concessions that were necessary to protect employment of union drivers were not politically feasible. Currently, the trucking industry is characterized by a union sector much smaller than during the regulatory period and in which union drivers continue to realize a sizable albeit reduced wage premium, a portion of which is offset by higher quality among union drivers. ). Within each file, individuals were sorted as appropriate on the basis of ascending and descending household ID, year, and age. To be considered an acceptable matched pair, a rotation 8 individual had to be matched with a rotation 4 individual with identical household ID, identical survey month, and an age difference between 0 and 2 (since surveys can occur on different days of the month, age change need not equal 1). Several passes were necessary because a single household may contain more than one male or female pair. Checks were provided to insure that only unique matches were selected. For each rotation 8 individual, the search was made through all rotation 4 individuals with the same ID to make sure there was only one possible match; the file was resorted in reverse order and each selected rotation 4 individual was checked to ensure a unique rotation 8 match. As uniquely matched pairs were identified they were removed from the work file. Incorrect changes in the variables marital status, veteran status, race, and education (e.g., a change in schooling other than 0 or 1, a change from married to never married, etc.) were used to delete "bad" observations in households where there were multiple observations and ages too close to separate matched pairs. Several passes at the data were made. In households where two pairs of individuals could be separated based on a 1-year but not the 0-2-year age change, a 1-year criterion was used. If a unique pair could not be identified based on these criteria, they were not included in the data set (e.g., four observations with two identical pairs, or three individuals with two possible matches using the 0-2 age change criterion).
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